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RoPER: So now you'd give the Devil the benifzt of law! 
MoRE: Yes. What would you do? Cut a great road through the law to get 
after the Devil? 
RoPER: I'd cut down every law in England to do that! 
MoRE: (Roused and Excited) Oh? (Advances on RoPER) And when the 
last law was down, and the Devil turned mund on you-where would 
you hide, Roper, the laws all being flat. (He leaves him). This coun-
try 's planted thick with laws from coast to coast-man 's laws, not 
God 's-and if you cut them down-and you're just the man to do it-
d'you really think you could stand upright in the winds that would 
t B.A, Princeton University, 1995; candidate for J.D., Cornell Law School, 2002. 
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blow then? (Quietly) Yes, I'd give the Devil benefit of law, for my own 
safety's sake. 
-A JUan for All Seasons1 
INTRODUCTION 
The September 11 terrorist attacks prompted the federal govern-
ment to enact several laws focused on preventing further acts of vio-
lence against the United States. In very quick fashion, Congress 
passed L~e USJ\ .. Patriot P~ct on October 26, 2001. 2 Soon 5lfter Lhe law's 
passage, the Bush administration asserted its executive power, issuing 
a number of n1les and executive orders. Recent presidential orders 
have allowed military tribunals to Lry persons charged 1vith terrorism, 3 
detentions of hundreds of foreign nationals,4 measures precluding 
the release of names or information concerning detainees,5 and a Bu-
reau of Prisons (BOP) nlle authorizing monitoring of communica-
tions between detainees and their attorneys. 6 
The government's interception of attorney-client communica-
tions has engendered significant criticism and prompted numerous 
Senate hearings. 7 In particular, critics have claimed that the intercep-
tion violates both the attorney-client privilege and the Sixth A.t!1end-
ment.8 This Note examines the validity of these claims. In addition, 
RoBERT BoLT, A MAN FOR ALL SEASONS 66 (1960). Senator Russell D. Feingold 
quoted this portion of Lh.e play on Lhe Senate floor on October 25, 2001, as he explained 
his opposition to the USA Patriot Act. See 14 7 GoNG. REc. S10,990, S11 ,023 (daily ed. Oct. 
25, 2001) (statement of Sen. Feingold). 
2 USA Patriot Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272; see also Jim McGee, An 
Intelligence Giant in the Mahing: Anti-Ten-arism Law Lihel:y to Bring Domestic Apparatus of Unprece-
dented Scope, WASH. PosT, Nov. 4, 2001, at A4 (cliscussing the USA Patriot Act). 
3 See Robin Toner & Neil A. Lewis, White Hause Push an Security Steps Bypasses Congress, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2001, at A1 (discussing an Executive Order that authorizes the Presi-
dent and the Secretary of Defense to create military courts to try non-citizens accused of 
terrorist activities) . 
.J See Dan Eggen, Ashcraft Defends Anti-Terrorism Steps, WASH. PosT, Dec. 7, 2001, at A1 
(explaining Attorney General Ashcroft's position before the Senate Judiciary Committee 
that the practice is lawful and necessary to prevent future attacks). 
5 See id. 
6 See Prevention of Acts of Violence and Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 55,062 (Oct. 31, 
2001) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R pts. 500 & 501). 
7 See Ann Davis, Attorney-Client Confidentiality Waived in Rule, WALL ST.]., Nov. 9, 2001, 
at Bl; Eggen, supra note 4; William Glaberson, Legal Experts Divided an Now Antitcrror Policy 
That Scuttles Lawyer-Client Confidentiality, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2001, at B7. 
8 Senator Patrick Leahy has been the most notable and vocal critic of attorney-client 
communications monitoring. See Letter from Senator Patrick Leahy, Chairman, Senate 
Judiciary Committee, to john Ashcroft, Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice (Nov. 
9, 2001), http:/ /leahy.senate.gov/press/200111/110901.html; see, e.g., DO] Oversight: Pre-
serving Our Freedoms While Defending Against Terrorism: Hearing Before the S. Camm. an the judici-
ary, 107th Cong. (Dec. 4, 2001) [hereinafter DO] Oversight Hearings] (testimony of Nadine 
Strossen, President, ACLU), 2001 WI.. 1553668; Statement of Robert E. Hirshon, President, 
American Bar Association (Nov. 9, 2001), http:/ /www.abanet.org/leadership/jus-
tice_department.htrnl. But see Bruce Fein, Privilege Bows to Danger, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 13, 
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this Note explores other less intrusive means available to the govern-
ment to prevent acts of violence that involve attorney-client communi-
cations. Finally, this Note explores what role professional 
responsibility rules may play in determining defense lawyers' responsi-
bilities in this very new and terrifying area. 
I 
THE BUREAU OF PRISONS RULE 
The BOP rule was published in the Federal Register on October 
31, 2001.9 The new rule authorizes the Attorney General to order the 
BOP Director to monitor or review communications between inmates 
and lawyers for the purpose of deterring future acts that could result 
in death or serious bodily injury to persons or property.10 The Attor-
ney General may issue the order when federal law enforcement agen-
cies have reasonable suspicion to believe that a particular inmate may 
use attorney-client communications to facilitate acts of terrorism. 11 
Under the BOP rule, monitoring of communications does not require 
judicial approval, an:d the Attorney General has complete authority to 
determine procedures for reviewing communications for attorney-cli-
ent privilege claims and excluding privileged materials.12 Generally, 
the BOP Director must provide written notice to both the inmate and 
the lawyer before initiating any monitoring.13 The BOP rule also con-
templates a "privilege team," separate and apart from the prosecution 
and investigation, that will monitor attorney-client communication.14 
The privilege team may not disclose any intercepted information with-
out court approval, except where the material the team obtains indi-
cates that violent acts are imminent.15 Such monitoring may continue 
for one year without further authorization.16 As of December .6, 2001, 
at least sixteen inmates' conversations with their attorneys were being 
monitored under the rule. 17 
The government justifies the BOP rule on national security 
grounds, claiming that it has balanced the interests of protecting in-
2001, at A16 (defending the BOP rule as a reasonable and measured response to terrorist 
attacks). 
9 Prevention of Acts of Violence and Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. at 55,062. 
10 Jd. at 55,066. 
l1 I d. 
12 See id. 
13 Id. 
14 See id. 
15 Jd. 
16 See id. at 55,065. 
17 See Excerpts from Attorney General's Testimony Before Senate judiciary Committee, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 7, 2001, at B6. 
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nocent .A~merican lives and safeguarding liberties. 18 The government 
also claims that monitoring attorney-client communications under the 
new nlle merely closes a loophole in already existing administrative 
measures that were designed to restrict communications of detainees 
who could perpetrate acts of violence or terrorism. 19 The govern-
ment, however, aclmowledges the extraordinary nature of monitoring 
attorney-client communications, seeking only to monitor these com-
munications in specific instances where "the Bureau may have sub-
stantial reason to believe that certain inmates who have been involved 
in terrorist activities will pass messages through their attorneys .. : to 
individuals on the outside for the purpose of continuing terrorist 
activities. "20 
The BOP rule summary supports monitoring attorney-client com-
munications with reference to the crime-fraud exception to the attor-
ney-client privilege.21 The crime-fraud exception, however, generally 
relates to issues of disclosing evidence in court. 22 Given the trial-re-
lated function and purpose of the privilege and its exception, the judi-
ciary should make the determination of whether the privilege or an 
exception to the privilege applies.23 \AJhere tl1e governme11t ir1trt1des 
on this privilege without judicial approval, it clearly violates the privi-
lege's utilitarian and humanistic goals. 24 
The BOP n1le summary also explains that monitoring attorney-
client communications does not implicate the Sixth Amendment be-
cause the rule does not upset adversarial fairness. 25 According to the 
summary, the government has a legitimate law enforcement interest, 
and the procedures in place prevent both disclosure of privileged ma-
terial and the prosecution's use of any intercepted information absent 
court approval.26 Notwithstanding the argument that the procedures 
might not actually protect the information obtained from the investi-
gation and prosecution teams, the government's justifications suggest 
that the use of privileged information would implicate only Sixth 
Amendment fairness concerns. The government explanation evades 
the critical privacy component of the effective assistance of counsel 
right. That interest involves free and frank communication between 
18 DO] Oversight Hearings, supra note 8 (testimony of Viet D. Dinh, Assistant Attorney 
General, Department of Justice). 
19 See id.; see also 28 C.F.R. pt. 501 (2001) (setting forth the scope of the BOP rules). 
20 Prevention of Acts of Violence and Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. at 55,064. 
21 See id. 
22 See generally David]. Fried, Too High a Price for Truth: The Exception to the Attorncy-
Clieul Privilege for Conte1llploted CTirnes and Frauds, 64 N.C. L. REv. 443 (1986) (tracing the 
history of the crime fraud exception). 
23 See inji·a Part II.B. 
24 See inji-o notes 37-41 and accompanying text. 
25 See Prevention of Acts of Violence and Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. at 55,064. 
26 See id. 
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the lawyer and her client. 27 Any indication that the government will 
monitor privileged conversations is likely to chill attorney-client com-
munication, and therefore, the BOP rule violates the Sixth 
Amendment.28 
It should also be noted that in the. wake of the September 11 
attacks, the Federal Bureau of Investigation has announced its intent 
to combine its intelligence gathering and law enforcement fimc-
tions.29 This union weakens the BOP rule's claim that a firewall will 
adequately protect monitored information from these teams. The 
summary cites cases supporting firewall procedures that apply to, 
among other things, wiretapping.30 Wiretaps, however, may not be 
obtained by law enforcement without court approval.31 Again, the 
lack of judicial involvement in a se1ious area of constitutional law 
throws into question the new rule's legality. 
The attorney-client privilege and the Sixth Amendment are very 
much intertwined. Indeed, some commentators have argued that the 
privilege is constitutionally protected within the Sixth Amendment.32 
For analytic clarity, however, the following Parts present separate criti-
ques of how the BOP rule violates the fundamental legal protections 
of both the attorney-client privilege and the Sixth Amendment. 
II 
THE BuREAu oF PRisoNs RuLE VIOLATES 
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE 
A. Background on the Attorney-Client Privilege 
The attorney-client privilege is the oldest of common law privi-
leges, dating back to at least 1654.33 From 1654 through today there 
remains a tension between truth and privacy within the privilege's 
scope and applicability. Professor Geoffrey Hazard has characterized 
27 See infra Part III.A. 
28 Some commentators have also argued that the BOP rule violates the Fourth 
Amendment. See Akhil Reed Amar & Vikram David Amar, The New Regulation Allowing 
Federal Agents to Monitor Attorney-Client Conversations: Why It Threatens Fourth Amendment Val-
ues, FINoLAw.coM, Nov. 16, 2001, at http:/ /writ.news.findlaw.com/amar/200llll6.html. 
29 See McGee, supra note 2 (describing the FBI's new anti-terrorism powers as ending 
segregation within the Bureau of its criminal investigation function and its information 
gathering on foreign spies and terrorists). Assistant Attorney General Michael Chertoff 
was quoted as saying, "What we are going to have is a Federal Bureau of Investigation that 
combines intelligence with effective law enforcement." Id. 
30 See Prevention of Acts of Violence and Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. at 55,064. 
31 See id. 
32 See, e.g., Martin R. Gardner, The Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel and Its Underlying 
Values: Defining the Scope of Privacy Protection, 90]. CruM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 397, 410-11 
(2000). 
33 SeeUpjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383,389 (1981); Geoffrey C. Hazard,Jr., 
An Historical Perspective on the Attorney-Client Privilege, 66 CAL. L. REv. 1061, 1070 (1978). 
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the dilemma as making a "value choice ... involv[ing] the acceptance 
of an evil-betrayal of confidence or suppression of truth."34 The de-
termination of the privilege's applicability is further complicated by 
the possible crime-fraud exception in the context of a nation fealjng 
future terrorist attacks. 
Professor Wigmore stated the general formulation of the attor-
ney-client privilege as follows: 
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional 
legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relat-
ing to that purpose, ( 4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) 
are at his instance permanently protected (7) from disclosure by 
himself or by the legal adviser, (8) except the protection be 
waived.35 
The privilege applies normally in a judicial context where a lawyer 
may be called to testifY or required to produce evidence concerning a 
client. The privilege is intended to enable full legal advice and repre-
sents the view that there are "many things in life that should not be 
open to public inspection, even for 'good cause."'36 Thus, the attor-
ney-client privilege rests upon both utilitarian and humanistic 
principles. 37 
From a utilitarian perspective, the privilege is necessary to ensure 
effective legal advice through the lawyer's promise of privacy and, 
hence, candid client disclosure.38 By divulging confidential informa-
tion clients enable their lawyers to present as many legal options as 
possible. Such legal advice will, in turn, assure society general obedi-
ence of the law.39 
The humanistic approach emphasizes the privilege's function of. 
enhancing the client's "autonomy, dignity and privacy."40 Given the 
law's complexity and severity, privileging attorney-client communica-
tions ensures that the client will be able to put on his best case by 
informing the lawyer of all related matters. Particularly in a criminal 
case, where the government can summon all of its powers against an 
individual, the defendant should not be denied the opportunity to 
enable his lawyer to compete adequately in the adversarial process by 
disclosing all information. The lawyer should also be viewed as an 
34 See Hazard, supra note 33, at 1085. 
35 8 JoHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALs AT CoMMON LAw § 2292 (McNaugh-
ton rev. 1961) (emphasis omitted). 
36 Hazard, supra note 33, at 1061. 
37 See Roger C. Cramton & Lori P. Knowles, Professional Secrecy and Its Exceptions: 
Spaulding v. Zimmerman Revisited, 83 MINN. L. REv. 63, 102-03 (1998); see also Fried, supra 
note 22, at 490-92 (referring to the "instrumental" and "intrinsic value" justifications for 
attomey-dient privilege). 
38 See Cramton & Knowles, supra note 37, at 102-03. 
39 See id. 
40 !d. 
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extension of the individual defendant. Thus, requiring a lawyer, for 
example, to testify as to communications she had with her client 
might violate the client's Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination. 41 
The privilege, however, is subject to the crime-fraud exception, 
which applies when an attorney~client conversation furthers a crime 
or fraud. Stated differently, "[i]n such circumstances, it is arguable 
that the privilege, by its own terms, is not applicable."42 The commu-
nications could then be characterized as failing at least one of Wig-
more's requirements, namely that the lawyer, by vir.tue of her 
complicity, is not then functioning in her professional capacity. Crit-
ics have suggested that the exception may well swallow the rule, per-
mitting prosecutors to subpoena lawyers and execute wiretaps on 
lawyers' offices based on the argument that the privilege does not ex-
ist due to alleged wrongdoing. 43 
B. Application of the Attorney-Client Privilege and the Crime-
Fraud Exception 
The Department ofJustice supports the BOP rule on the ground 
that the crime-fraud exception should apply. In its summary of the 
BOP rule, the Justice Department cites one Supreme Court case and a 
number of circuit court cases in support of the crime-fraud excep-
tion's applicability.44 The facts of the noted cases, however, differ sig-
nificantly from the new regulation and do not support applying the 
exception without judicial imprimatur. 
For example, in Clark v. United States,45 the Supreme Court held 
that the attorney-client privilege is overcome where there is a "show-
ing of a prima facie case sufficient to satisfy the judge that the light 
should be let in."46 In this case the lower court found a juror guilty of 
criminal contempt for giving false answers during voir dire. The Su-
preme Court found that other jurors' testimony regarding matters 
that took place in the jury room could not be shielded by any privi-
lege, likening the situation to one allowing for the crime-fraud excep-
4l See id. 
42 Hazard, supra note 33, at 1063-64. 
43 See A viva Abramovsky, Traitors in Our Midst: Attorneys Who Inform on Their Clients, 2 U. 
PA.]. CONST. L. 676, 695 (2000); Fried, supra note 22, at 498-99; Michael Goldsmith & 
Kathryn Ogden Balmforth, The Electronic Surveillance of Privileged Communications: A Conflict 
in Doctrines, 64 S. CAL. L. REv. 903, 904-05 (1991); Max D. Stern & David Hoffman, Privi-
leged Informers: The Attorney Subpoena Problem and a Proposal for Reform, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 
1783, 1846 (1988). But see Cramton & Knowles, supra note 37, at 114-17 (responcling to 
arguments against broadening exceptions to confidentiality). 
44 See Prevention of Acts of Violence and Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 55,062, 55,064 (Oct. 
31, 2001) (to be coclified at 28 C.F.R. pts. 500 & 501). 
45 289 u.s. 1 (1933). 
46 Id. at 14. 
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tion. 47 In contrast to the facts of Clark, the BOP rule does not 
implement procedures under which a judge could decide that the 
privilege should not attach and that sufficient evidence permitted an 
exception. Rather, the BOP rule allows th~ Attorney General to order 
the BOP Director to provide measures for monitoring of attorney-cli-
ent communications.48 The order may be based upon information 
from a head federal law enforcement official that reasonable suspi-
cion exists that an inmate will communicate with his lawyer to facili-
tate an act of terrorism.49 Thus, the BOP rule permits law 
enforcement officials to determine whether to eviscerate the protec-
tions of the attorney-client privilege, completely sidestepping the judi-
cial involvement presumed in Clark and the other cases cited by the 
Justice Department. 
The BOP rule's lack of any prescribed judicial role in determin-
ing the applicability of the crime-fraud exception is particularly egre-
gious in light of the recent Supreme Court case United States v. Zolin.50 
In Zolin the Court allowed for in camera review to ascertain "whether 
allegedly privileged attorney-client communications fall within the 
crime-fraud exception."51 The government, however, must meet a 
threshold showing even to obtain in camera review. The Court held 
that "before a district court may engage in in camera review at the re-
quest of the party opposing the privilege, that party must present evi-
dence sufficient to support a reasonable belief that in camera review may 
yield evidence that establishes the exception's applicability."52 Thus, 
Zolin does not even countenance a blanket rule permitting a judge to 
conduct in camera review for deciding the exception's applicability. 
The Court noted that such a policy would inhibit "open and legiti-
mate disclosure between attorneys and clients" and might violate the 
client's due process rights.53 
It is true that the BOP rule contemplates a context different from 
the traditional evidentiary concerns that Zolin addresses. Yet notwith-
standing national security interests, the BOP rule will adversely affect 
47 Two cited cases, United States v. Gordon-Nikkar, 518 F.2d 972 (5th Cir. 1975) and 
United States v. Soudan, 812 F.2d 920 (5th Cir. 1986), are similar appeals of district court 
decisions regarding the applicability of the attorney-client privilege. In another cited case, 
In re Grand jury Proceedings, 87 F.3d 377 (9th Cir. 1996), the Ninth Circuit laid out the 
requirements that the government must establish before the district court to trigger the 
crime-fraud exception. See id. A sneaking suspicion is not enough. /d. at 381. "Rather, the 
district court must find 'reasonable cause to believe' that the attorney's services were 'uti-
lized ... in furtherance of the ongoing unlawful scheme.'" !d. 
48 See Prevention of Acts of Violence and Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. at 55,066. 
49 !d. 
50 491 u.s. 554 (1989). 
51 !d. at 574. 
52 !d. at 574-75 (second emphasis added). 
53 !d. at 571. 
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the attorney-client relationship and will have ramifications within the 
traditional evidentiary context. Security concerns cannot justify a 
complete abandonment of any judicial role. 
The quantum of evidence that would satisfy the Zolin standard of 
"reasonable belief' for merely obtaining a court's in camera review of 
evidence supporting the crime-fraud exception may be akin to the 
BOP rule's "reasonable suspicion" standard. However, the BOP rule 
imposes that standard for intercepting attorney-client communica-
tion, and serves as a presumptive finding that the crime-fraud excep-
tion applies. It makes little sense to give law enforcement the 
discretion to decide that the crime-fraud exception attaches. In ef-
fect, the BOP rule allows the fox to guard the henhouse. Given the 
Zolin Court's resistance to blanket in camera review for determining 
the crime-fraud exception's applicability, it stretches credulity to think 
that the Attorney General's unilateral review is acceptable. As the 
Zolin Court warned, "'a complete abandonment of judicial control 
would lead to intolerable abuses."'54 
C. Other Options 
The new regulation is not, of course, the only means by which the 
government intrudes or has intruded on attorney-client confidences. 
Through eavesdropping and electronic surveillance the government 
has arguably often violated the attorney-client privilege. Yet even 
under Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 
1968 (Title III), 55 the government has not been so brazen as to in-
trude on attorney-client confidentiality without court approval. 
Title III does not prohibit the government from monitoring at-
torney-client communications. Rather, it generally precludes the use 
of such communications as evidence.56 Law enforcement may eaves-
drop by obtaining warrants for electronic surveillance for serious 
crimes.57 In addition to significantly more detailed procedures that 
apply to the law enforcement officials than are required under the 
BOP rule, Title III requires independent judicial review. In fact, a 
surveillance order may be issued only by federal district or circuit 
courtjudges, not by magistrates.58 
In order to pass judicial review, the government must describe 
with particularity the person whose communications are to be moni-
tored as well as the type of communications. 5 9 The government must 
54 Id. (quoting United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 8 (1953)). 
55 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521 (1994). 
56 See id. § 2517(4)-(5). 
57 See id. § 2516(1). 
58 See id. § 2518(1). 
59 !d.§ 2518(1)(b), (d). 
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also show why less intrusive measures would not achieve the same pur-
pose.60 The judge shall issue an eavesdropping order only upon find-
ing probable cause that the suspect is involved in the crime described, 
that eavesdropping will elicit information regarding the offense, and 
that less intrusive measures -were insufficient. 61 Finally, the warrant is 
only valid for thirty days. 62 
National security is one statutory ground for obtaining a war-
rant. 63 In addition, Title III provides for emergency situations during 
which monitors may listen to communications without judicial author-
ization. 64 The exception applies to instances where there is a threat of 
death, serious injury, or a national security threat. 65 In contrast to the 
BOP rule, Title III requires law enforcement to apply for a surveil-
lance order witl1in forty-eight hours after the interception.66 
Despite these detailed and exact.hJ.g requirements that both law 
enforcement and judges must fulfill before eavesdropping on commu-
nications, commentators have called for further protection of attor-
ney-client communications under Title III. Weighing attorney-client 
confidentiality against the government interest in prosecuting corrupt 
attorneys, Professors Ronald Goldstock and Steven Chananie have 
called for even more judicial oversight. In particular, Goldstock and 
Chananie recommend a "focus on the issuance and execution of 
search warrants targeting law offices and attorneys' papers, as well as 
on electronic surveillance warrants of attorneys. "67 Professor Gold-
smith and commentator Kathryn Balmforth have also called for fur-
ther judicial supervision, suggesting daily review where law 
enforcement monitors privileged communications.68 Goldsmith and 
Balrnforth would also "amend Title III to require probable cause that 
both parties are involved in a crime before any potentially privileged 
communications may be monitored."69 In addition, they would re-
quire that probable cause be proved independent of the privileged 
communications. 7o 
60 Id. § 2518(1} (c). 
61 See id. § 2518(3). 
62 Id. § 2518(5):' 
63 See id. § 2511 (2) (f). 
64 See id. § 2518 (7). 
65 Id. § 2518(7) (a). 
66 See id. § 2518(7). 
67 Ronald Goldstock & Steven Chananie, "Criminal" Lawyers: The Use of Electronic Sur-
veillance and Search Warrants in the Investigation and Prosecution of Attorneys Suspected of Crimi-
nal Wrongdoing, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 1855, 1876-77 (1988). 
68 See Goldsmith & Balmforth, supra note 43, at 947. 
69 Id. at 945. 
70 Id. Note how the Title Ill procedures of judicial review differ from those estab-
lished in Zolin. See discussion supra Part II.B. 
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Law enforcement may also intrude upon attorney-client confi-
dentiality by issuing grand jury subpoenas to lawyers. Although such 
government interference may occur without judicial approval, a sub-
poena is not as invasive or detrimental to the attorney-client relation-
ship as is pervasive monitorihg. Still, such practices no doubt threaten 
the privacy of the communications and thereby inhibit both the privi-
lege's instrumental and personal purposes. 
The Justice Department, in fact, recognized the attorney subpoe-
nas' adverse effects on the attorney-client relationship and instituted 
internal guidelines regarding subpoena requests. Among its require-
ments, the guidelines maintain that law enforcement exhaust alterna-
tive means of obtaining the information sought, show that the need 
for a subpoena outweighs the harm done to the attorney~client rela-
tionship, narrowly tailor the subpoena, and refrain from seeking privi-
leged information.71 The guidelines, however, are merely aspirational 
and are not enforceable. Not surprisingly, commentators have called 
for prior judicial review of attorney subpoenas at either ex parte or 
adversary hearings.72 
Practitioners have also suggested alternative means to preventing 
acts of terrorism through attorney-client communications. Immigra-
tion lawyer Michael Boyle, for example, suggested the possibility of 
removing attorneys from the case and explained that "prosecutors are 
always free to initiate criminal proceedings against attorneys where ap-
propriate."73 These options would ensure judicial review where law-
yers abuse the attorney-client privilege, protect confidentiality, and 
permit the government "to investigate and prevent criminal activity 
without obstruction."74 · 
Statutory and case law emphasize the critical role judges should 
play in preserving both the attorney-client privilege and public safety. 
71 See Stern & Hoffinan, supra note 43, at 1818 & n.177. In addition, there are some 
professional responsibility limitations placed on prosecutorial conduct. See MoDEL RuLES 
OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(f) (2000). 
!d. 
The prosecutor in a criminal case shall ... not subpoena a lawyer in a 
grand jury or other criminal proceeding to present evidence about a·past or 
present client unless the prosecutor reasonably believes: (1) the informa-
tion sought is not protected from disclosure by any applicable privilege; (2) 
the evidence sought is essential to the successful completion of an ongoing 
investigation or prosecution; and (3) there is no other feasible alternative 
to obtain the information. 
72 See Stern & Hoffman, supra note 43, at 1820, 1831-34; see also GEOFFREY C. HAzARD, 
JR. ET AL., THE LAw AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING 257-58 (1999) (describing ABA efforts to . 
require prosecutors to obtain court approval before serving subpoenas on lawyers). 
73 DO] Oversight Hearings, supra note 8 (written testimony of Michael Boyle, American 
Immigration Lawyers Association), http:/ /www.ai]a.org/newsroom/21 ts1 002.htrnl (last vis-
ited Apr. 15, 2002). 
74 Jd. 
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Title HI, in particular, is an available statute that could serve Lhe gov-
ernment's goal of stopping imminent terrorist attacks furthered 
through otherwise privileged communications while at the same time 
better maintaining the confidentiality of the attorney-client relation-
ship. Title III may be distinguished on grounds that it is largely a 
prosecutorial or investigative statute, whereas the new regulation seeks 
merely to stop acts of violence. The emergency provision of Title III, 
however, suggests that there are ways in which judicial approval could 
still be obtained, albeit some time after monitoring begins. Ulti-
mately, law enforcement should not be the final authority on whether 
to pierce the attorney-client relationship's confidentiality. Available 
procedures exist, and further measures can be adopted, that would 
afford judges the opportunity to determine the applicability of privi-
leges and possible exceptions. 
III 
Th'E BuREAu oF PRisoNs RuLE VIOLATES THE 
SIXTH AMENDMENT 
A. Background on Lhe Sixth Amendment 
One scholar has characterized the Sixth Amendmenl as "the 
heartland of constitutional criminal procedure."75 Professor Akhil 
Amar identifies the deep principles of the Amendment as "the protec-
tion of innocence and the pursuit of truth."76 In particular, the BOP 
rule implicates the Sixth Amendment's guarantee that" [i]n all crimi-
nal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the 
Assistance of Counsel for his defence."77 
The 1ight to counsel guarantee may be viewed as upholding at 
least tvvo different, albeit related, substantive and procedural values: 
privacy and fair11ess. 78 VV11etl1er gover11111e11t !TIOl1itorin.g of attor11ey-
clie11t coiTITI1lH1ications violates a perso11's Sixtl1 P.J11en.d111ent rig!1ts 
largely depends on what interest a court believes is at stake. 
In its Sixth Amendment analysis, the Supreme Court has often 
invoked the value of fairness as underpinning tl1e right to counsel. In 
Gideon v. vVainwrighi,79 the Court stated that only tl1rough the right to 
counsel could a defendant achieve even approximately equal legal 
75 Akhil Reed Amar, Fomvord: Sixth Amendment First Principles, 84 CEo. L.J. 641, 641 
(1996). 
76 Jd. at 642. 
77 U.S. CaNST. amend. VI. 
78 See \Veatherlord v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 5'15, 562-63 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting); 
Gardner. supra note 32, at 398, 404-10 (discussing autonomy as another value underlying 
the Sixth Amendment). 
79 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
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footing against the state adversary. 80 Under this traditional Sixth 
Amendment analysis, the right to counsel supports "the procedural 
goal of trial fairness" by enabling lay defendants to navigate legal com-
plexities against the State.81 Coupled with due process, the right to 
counsel promotes the "integrity of the adversary system ... [and] is 
undermined when the prosecution surreptitiously acquires informa-
tion concerning the defense strategy and evidence (or lack of it), the 
defendant, or' the defense counsel."82 
Courts and commentators rriay also view the right to counsel from 
a privacy perspective. 83 A government intrusion arguably triggers 
Sixth Amendment privacy concerns. In Ceders v. United States,84 the 
Court held that an order preventing a defendant from speaking with 
his lawyer during a seventeen-hour overnight recess between his di-
rect- and cross-examination violated his Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel.85 The Court observed: 
"The right to be heard would be, in many cases, oflittle avail if it did 
not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. . . . [A defen-
dant] is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence .... He lacks both the 
skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though 
he [may] have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of 
counsel at every step in the proceedings against him."86 
Notably, the privacy analysis does not require a finding of prejudice as 
a result of government interference.8 7 
Sixth Amendment interpretation becomes difficult because it is 
not always clear upon which principles courts analyze government in-
trusions of attorney-client confidentiality.88 Even where courts assert 
privacy values in their analysis, courts may not find a constitutional 
violation absent prejudicial effect to the defendant. United States v. 
80 See id. at 344; see also Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964) (holding 
that deliberately eliciting statements from a defendant outside the presence of his lawyer 
violates the Sixth Amendment). In Massiah, the defendant had already been indicted and 
retained a la,vyer. See id. at 201. Law enforcement wired an informant and monitored his 
initiated communications with the defendant. See id. at 202-04. The Court reversed the 
defendant's conviction and suppressed the statements. See id. at 206-07. 
81 Gardner, supra note 32, at 404. 
82 Weatherford, 429 U.S. at 562 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
83 See DO] Oversight Hearings, supra note 8 (written testimony of Nadine Strossen, Presi-
dent, ACLU) (Dec. 4, 2001), http:/ /judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfin?id=128&wit_ 
id=83. "The essential bedrock of the Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel is 
the ability to communicate privately with counsel." Id:, cf Gardner, supra note 32, at 410 
(suggesting that privacy is not as clear an underlying value as are fairness and autonomy). 
84 425 U.S. 80 (1976). 
85 Jd. at 91. 
86 Jd. at 88-89 (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932)) (alterations in 
original). 
87 !d. at 92-93 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
88 Arguably, the Ceders quotation from Powel~ supra note 86, indicates the difficulty in 
distinguishing privacy interests from fairness concerns. 
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Morrison89 illustrates the merging of both principles in judicial analy-
sis. The Morrison Court assumed, without deciding, that where law en-
forcement solicited a represented defendant's cooperation outside 
the presence of her lawyer, the government had in fact violated her 
right to counsel.90 The Court, however, did not find any demonstra-
ble prejudice to the defendant and would not approve dismissal as a 
remedy.91 Thus, Morrison essentially reverted to the fairness principles 
of the Sixth Amendment.9 2 
B. Applying the Sixth Amendment to Government Monitoring 
of Attorney-Client Communications 
1. Weatherford v. Bursey 
In its smnmary of the BOP rule, the Justice Department cites Wea-
therford v. Bursey93 for the proposition that "the presence of a govern-
ment informant during conversations between a defendant and his or 
her attorney may, but need not, impair the defendant's Sixth Amend-
ment right to effective assistance of counsel."94 Such an equivocal 
stance reveals the ambiguity of the Supreme Court's most in-depth 
discussion of governmental intrusions on the attorney-client relation-
ship. The result has been a split between the circuits over what intru-
sion does, in fact, violate the Sixth Amendment. To further aggravate 
the uncertain state of the law, because government intrusions may 
take on many different forms which often have very different fact pat-
terns, it is next to impossible to establish one rule.95 
89 449 u.s. 361 (1981). 
90 See id. at 362-64. 
91 See id. at 366:..67. 
92 Morrison raises the issue that a number of Sixth Amendment cases elicit-whether a 
right can really exist if there is no remedy. See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. 
Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Rmwdies, 104 HARv. L. REv. 1731, 
1778-79 (1991). 
Few principles of the American constitutional tradition resonate more 
strongly than one stated in Marbury v. Madison: for every violation of a right, 
there must be a remedy. Yet Marbury's apparent promise of effective re-
dress for all constitutional violations reflects a principle, not an ironclad 
rule, and its ideal is not always attained. 
I d. at 1778, See also Note, Government Intrusions into the Defense Camp: Undermining the Right to 
Counse~ 97 HARv. L. REv. 1143, 1159-61 (1984) (summarizing courts' remedial choices in 
Sixth Amendment cases). 
93 429 U.S. 545, 552-54 (1977). 
94 Prevention of Acts of Violence and Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 55,062, 55,064 (Oct. 31, 
2001) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R pts. 500 & 501). 
95 Government intrusions may entail informants, wiretapping, or electronic surveil-
lance. The intrusions may tal<:e place in a home, a prison, an office, and may or may not 
involve attorney-client communication. The Supreme Court and the D.C. Circuit had ad-
dressed government intrusion prior to Weatherford. However, it was a matter of some dis-
pute whether and to what extent the Sixth Amendment was implicated in the Supreme 
Court decisions. See O'Brien v. United States, 386 U.S. 345 (1967) (per curiam) (vacating 
judgment and remanding for a new trial after Solicitor General acknowledged electronic 
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In · Weatheiford, the defendant and an undercover agent were ar-
rested for vandalizing a county Selective Service office. The under-
cover agent met with both the defendant and his counsel at trial 
planning sessions on two separate occasions in order to maintain his 
masquerade and avoid suspicion.96 The agent then testified as a gov-
ernment witness. The district court found that the agent did not com-
municate anything to either his superiors or the prosecution 
regarding trial plans.97 Due to the lack of such communication, the 
Covrt was unconvinced that the defendant had even made out a Sixth 
Amendment claim.9B 
Weatheiford was apparently decided primarily on fairness grounds. 
The Court buttressed its holding by observing that "this is not a situa-
tion where the State's purpose was to learn what it could about the 
defendant's defense plans and the informant was instructed to in-
trude on the lawyer-client relationship or where the informant has as-
sumed for himself that task and acted accordingly. "99 
The Court explicitly rejected the Fourth Circuit's conclusion that 
"'whenever the prosecution knowingly arranges or permits intrusion 
into the attorney-client relationship the right to counsel is sufficiently 
endangered to require reversal and a new trial. "'100 Without both a 
communication of defense strategy and a deliberate intrusion, the 
Court refused to find a Sixth Amendment violation. 
Although the Court found no violation, Weatheiford offers sugges-
tions of what might constitute a valid Sixth Amendment claim. The 
Court presented a series of hypothetical facts that would have made 
the defendant's case stronger: 
Had Weatherford testified at Bursey's trial as to the conversation 
between Bursey and [his lawyer]; had any of the State's evidence 
originated in these conversations; had those overheard conversa-
tions been used in any other way to the substantial detriment of 
Bursey; or even had the prosecution learned from Weatherford, an 
eavesdropping); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 304-05 (1966) (fmding no Sixth 
Amendment violation where informant sat in on conversations between defendant and his 
lawyers); Black v. United States, 385 U.S. 26, 27-29 (1966) (per curiam) (ordering a new 
trial where FBI agents had monitored attorney-client communications for purposes unre-
lated to instant case and communications were inadvertently transcribed and used by gov-
ernment lawyers in preparing case); Coplon v. United States, 191 F.2d 749, 760 (D.C. Cir. 
1951) (explaining that government interception of telephone conversations between the 
accused and her lawyer would deny the accused her constitutional right to effective assis-
tance of counsel). 
96 See Weatherford, 429 U.S. at 547-48 (1977). 
97 See id. at 548, 556. 
98 See id. at 556. 
99 Id. at 557. 
100 Jd. at 549, 551 (quoting Bursey v. Weatherford, 528 F.2d 483, 486 (4th Cir. 1975), 
rev'd, 429 U.S. 545 (1977)). 
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undercover agent, the details of the Bursey-[lawyer] conversations 
... Bursey would have [had] a much stronger case.101 
The Court also acknowledged that "[o]ne threat to the effective assis-
tance of counsel posed by government interception of attorney-client 
communications lies in the inhibition of free exchanges between de-
fendant and counsel because of the fear of being overheard."102 In 
addition, the Court noted, the fear of an informant's presence "will 
inhibit attorney-client communication to a lesser degree than the fear 
that the government is monitoring those communications through 
electronic eavesdropping."103 . 
In his dissent, Justice Marshall argued that both fairness and pri-
vacy concerns were implicated by the undercover agent's presence at 
attorney-client meetings. Marshall argued on adversarial fairness 
grounds that the defendant was disadvantaged by the fact that the un-
dercover agent could testify using information he had learned from 
the privileged meetings.104 The privacy "right by definition is invaded 
when a government agent attends meetings of the defense team at 
which defense plans are reviewed."1os 
Most significantly, Justice Marshall took issue with the majority's 
requirement that the defendant show that the interception was inten-
tional and that t.;e contents were disclosed to t..~e prosecution.106 It is 
doubtful that a prosecutor or an informant would admit either the 
intent to initially monitor confidential lawyer-client communications, 
or that there was any improper communication between government 
lawyers and investigative team members. Given "the precious constitu-
tional rights at stake" and the insurmountable proof problem for a 
defendant, Marshall suggested "a prophylactic prohibition on all in-
trusions of this sort."107 
Weatherford remains a widely cited case.108 No doubt its ubiquity 
may have something to do with the fact Lhat its conclusions are partic-
ularly malleable. Although the majority did not find a Sixth Amend-
ment violation, Weatherford offers a near roadmap for defendants in 
making out Sixth Amendment claims. In addition, the vociferous dis-
sent has served as persuasive reasoning for finding that government 
intrusion is a per se Sixth Amendment violation. 
101 !d. at 554. 
102 !d. at 554-55 n.4. 
103 !d. at 555 n.4. 
104 See id. at 564 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
105 !d. (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
106 See id. at 565 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
107 Jd. (Marshall,]., dissenting). 
108 See, e.g., Robin Cheryl Miller, Annotation, Prapriety of Governmental Eavesdropj;ing on 
Communications Between Accused and His Attorney, 44 AL.R. 4th 841 (1986). 
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2. The Circuit Split 
The detritus of the Weatherford majority and dissenting opin-
ions-the difficult search for and clarification of the fairness and pri-
vacy interests underlying the Sixth Amendment-animates the circuit 
courts' decisions. Circuits that emphasize the fairness component in 
their Sixth Amendment analysis tend to require a showing of 
prejudice. Such a showing may be in addition to requiring proof of 
government intent to intercept communications and disclosure of 
that communication. 109 Other courts may also require that the gov-
ernment intrusion be committed in bad faith.l 1° Circuits that empha-
size the privacy component may suggest a Sixth Amendment 
protection of the attorney-client privilege. These circuits tend to pre-
sume prejudice where the government intended to intrude and to 
communicate the information.Ill 
United States v. Steelel 12 demonstrates the circuits' emphasis on 
fairness. In that case the Sixth Circuit required a showing of 
prejudice as integral to finding a violation of the defendant's Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel. 113 The court found that an informant's 
presence in a jail cell along with defendants and a defense lawyer was 
to protect the informant's identity.114 Thus, the court found that the 
government had no intent to intercept attorney-client confidences. In 
addition, the court found that whatever information the informant 
had overheard was not disclosed to the prosecution, nor was any of that 
information used as evidence against the defendants. In order to 
make out a constitutional violation, the Sixth Circuit held that in addi-
tion to the three criteria of Weatherford, the government also would 
have had to prejudice the defendant by its actions.l 15 
109 See, e.g., United States v. Glover, 596 F.2d 857, 863-64 (9th Cir. 1979) (finding that 
despite intentional intrusion by the government, evidence showing prejudicial effect 
against defendant as a result of interference with attorney-client communication was re-
quired to overturn a conviction). 
110 See, e.g., United States v. King, 753 F.2d 1, 1-3 (1st Cir. 1985) (finding no prejudice 
and thus no Sixth Amendment violation, and finding no egregious conduct by federal Jaw 
enforcement or the U.S. Attorney, even though state police had given some intercepted 
information to federal law officers). Some have argued that the BOP rule constitutes egre-
gious government action. For example, California criminal defense attorney Gigi Gordon 
believes that the government is using the September 11 attacks as a pretext in bad faith in 
order" 'to carve out this gigantic exception' to the attorney-client privilege." Beth Shuster, 
A Question of Confidentiality, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2001, at B2. 
111 See, e.g., Shillinger v. Haworth, 70 F.3d 1132, 1136-38 (lOth Cir. 1995) (upholding 
district court's determination that defendant's Sixth Amendment rights were violated with-
out requiring a showing of prejudice where deputy sheriff attended lawyer-client meetings 
and disclosed some of the information obtained to the prosecutor). 
112 727 F.2d 580 (6th Cir.l984). 
113 See id. at 586. 
l1 4 See id. 
115 See id. at 585-87. 
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United States v. Levy116 represents the circuits' privacy approach. 
There, a lawyer represented two co-defendants on narcotics charges. 
The lawyer, however, was not made aware that one of the defendants 
was an informant until after he had met with both clients together.l 17 
The prosecution then learned from the informant that the defense 
strategy was to focus on the credibility of a number of government 
witnesses. 118 Although law enforcement intended to intercept attorney-
client confidences and disclosed that information to the prosecution, 
the district court also required that the defendant show the intrusion 
to be "pertinent and prejudicial."119 The Third Circuit decried i:he 
lower court's standard as speculative and unfair to the defendant. 120 
Although the Third Circuit also found the government intrusion 
prejudicial, the court opined that such a test would require unusually 
cai!did disclosure by prosecutors. A prejudice test would also require 
judges to conduct difficult mini-trials on the subject-ones that would 
become all the more climbersome the later in the trial the intercep-
tion was disclosed. 121 
The court also rejected a prejudice test constructed along Fourth 
Amendment analysis lines which would only find prejudice when Lhe 
government would not have known the information or acquired the 
evidence absent the interception and disclosure.l 22 The Third Circuit 
would not accept a more severe prejudice test because, it held, the 
Sixth Amendment is predicated on "the presumed inability of a defen-
dant to make informed choices about the preparation and conduct of 
his defense."123 The court then appeared to rely chiefly on a privacy 
value understanding of the Sixth Amendment: 
Free two-way communication between client and attomey is essen-
tial if the professional assistance guaranteed by the sixth amend-
ment is to be meaningful. The purpose of the attomey-client 
privilege is inextricably linked to the very integrity and accuracy of 
the fact finding process itself. Even guilty individuals are entitled to 
be advised of strategies for their defense. In order for the adversary 
system to function properly, any advice received as a result of the 
defendant's disclosure to counsel must be insulated from the gov-
emment. No severe definition of prejudice, such as the fruit-of-the-
poisonous-tree evidentiary test in the fourth amendment area, 
could accommodate the broader sixth amendment policies. We 
think that the inquiry into prejudice must stop at the point where 
116 577 F.2d 200 (3d Cir. 1978). 
117 See id. at 202-03. 
118 See id. at 204--05. 
119 Id. at 208 (citation omitted). 
120 See id. 
121 See id. 
122 See id. at 208-09. 
123 Id. at 209. 
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attorney-client confidences are actually disclosed to the government 
enforcement agencies responsible for investigating and prosecuting 
the case. Any other rule would disturb the balance implicit in the 
adversary system and thus would jeopardize the very process by 
which guilt and innocence are determined in our society.124 
The Third Circuit's understanding of attorney-client confidentiality, 
however, is not disturbed by the government intrusion itself. Rather, 
it is the communication of those confidences to the investigating and 
prosecuting agencies that would constitute a violation of the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel. 
3. The BOP Rule Violates Fairness and Privacy Interests 
Virtually all of the government intrusion cases address invasions 
of the defense at a stage after the act has occurred. Most of these 
surveillance or informant cases are done surreptitiously and are acci-
dentally divulged at some later point. However, the BOP rule does 
not contemplate covert surveillance or eavesdropping. In fact, the 
BOP rule requires that the BOP Director inform both inmate and law-
yer of the monitoring.125 The antecedent disclosure appears well-in-
tentioned and seems to suggest a good-faith effort to forewarn lawyer 
and defendant, as well as add credence to the BOP rule's terrorist 
deterrence purposes. The warning, however, presents the problem of 
chilling speech-a dilemma not largely addressed by the circuits, but 
one that is alluded to by the Weatherford Court. Judge Posner also di-
rectly addressed the problem in the recent case United States v. 
DiDomenico. 126 
The Weatherford Court observed that government interception of 
attorney-client confidences could result "in the inhibition of free ex-
changes between defendant and counsel because of the fear of being 
overheard."127 Unfortunately, the Court was unclear as to whether 
this was a determinative factor, but diminished its significance in the 
instant case because there had been little reason for the lawyer and 
the defendant to have had such a fear and thus been so inhibited. 
Under the BOP rule, however, lawyer and defendant have every rea-
son to fear being overheard. In fact, they are told they will be listened 
to.12s 
In DiDomenico, defendants were charged with conspiracy in viola-
tion of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act 
(RICO). Prior to the trial, a defense attorney learned that the room 
124 !d. 
1 25 See Prevention of Acts of Violence and Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 55,062, 55,066 (Oct. 
31, 2001) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pts. 500 & 501). 
126 78 F.3d 294 (7th Cir. 1996). 
127 429 U.S. 545, 555 n.4 (1977). 
128 See Prevention of Acts of Violence and Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. at 55,066. 
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in which he had met vvith his client had been bugged, and that a tape 
recording was made of the conversations. 129 The defendants sought 
an evidentiary hearing to determine the severity of the bugging and 
whether the prosecution had obtained information about the defense. 
The government argued that no hearing was necessary because the 
defendant had not shown any prejudice.l 30 There was "no evidence 
that the prosecution was privy to the bugging or, if it was, used the 
information gleaned from it to undermine the defense or if it did 
caused innocent people to be convicted of heinous crimes."131 In an 
opinion Wiitten by Chief Judge Posner, the Seventh Circuit rejected 
this reasoning, explaining that denial of a criminal defendant's funda-
mental rights is reversible error even if completely harrnless.132 
With remarkable similarity to the BOP rule, the Seventh Circuit 
described a hypothetical rule to illustrate its view of the Si.'Cth A.uend-
ment 1ight to counsel's underlying privacy p1inciples: 
The government adopts and announces a policy of taping all con-
versations betvveen c1iminal defendants and their lawyers. It does 
not turn the tapes over to the prosecutors. It merely stores them in 
Ll]e National Archives. The government's lawyer took the position 
that none of the defendants could complain about such conduct 
because none could be harmed by it, provided the prosecutors 
never got their hands on the tapes. We are inclined to disagree .... 
The hypothetical practice that we have described would, because of 
its pervasiveness and publicity, greatly undermine the freedom of 
communication between defendants and their lawyers and with it 
the efficacy of the right to counsel, because knowledge that a per-
manent record was being made of the conversations between the 
defendants and their lawyers would make the defendants reluctant 
to make candid disclosures. (Totalitarian-style continuous surveil-
lance must surely be a great inhibitor of communication.) And yet 
it would be impossible in any given case to show that the outcome 
had been changed by the practice.133 
The Seventh Circuit distinguished its hypothetical from instances of 
"ad hoc governmental intrusion" (citing Weathe1jord as an example) 
where it is unlikely attorney-client communications would be dis-
turbed.13-l The court suggested that the bugging of the room where 
00 uu u 
lawyers and defendants met in the instant case could have chilled fur-
ther attorney-client communication because of the legitimate fear of 
being overheard.135 
129 See DiDomenico, 78 F.3d at 298. 
130 See id. at 299. 
131 ld. 
132 See id. 
133 Jd. 
13·1 ld. at 299-300. 
1 ~)5 See id. at 300. 
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The BOP rule's notice of monitoring will similarly chill attorney-
client communication. Indeed, if is likdy "the mere specter of moni-
toring will complicate the already difficult endeavor of communicat-
ing effectively with incarcerated clients and will chill the delicate 
relationship between the accused and his advocate."136 Thus, an es-
sential prerequisite for effective representation, "full and frank disclo-
sure" between attorney and client, will be precluded.137 
Chiefjudge Posner's example, however, is narrowly drawn in or-
der to demonstrate the importance of the privacy interest in the right 
to counsel. It remains unclear whether there exists some government 
or state interest that would justi:f)r a violation of the Sixth Amendment. 
As Weatherford also noted, "[o]ur cases ... have recognized the unfor-
tunate necessity of undercover work and the value it often is to effec-
tive law enforcement."138 
In its summary of the BOP rule, the Justice Department states 
that "a legitimate law enforcement interest in monitoring such conver-
sations" is "the prevention of acts of violence or terrorism."139 It is 
hard to imagine a more compelling state interest than preventing ter-
rorist attacks. However, as one commentator has observed, 
It is precisely when the government can posit a legitimate reason for 
the intmsion that courts should be most watchful; they should re-
quire the prosecutor to demonstrate that no alternatives less de-
structive of the defendant's rights were available and that all 
precautions were taken to shield the government from defense 
strategy information.140 
Given the BOP rule's intrusive effects on a defendant's Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel, the BOP rule may be criticized as having ig-
nored other available procedures to lessen the intrusion. 
The BOP rule does contemplate some procedures in order to 
safeguard the defendant's right to counsel. In particular, the proce-
dures involve "the use of a taint team and the building of a firewall 
[that] will ensure that the communications which fit under the pro-
tection of the attorney-client privilege will never be revealed to prose-
cutors and investigators."141 The rule summary cites cases approving 
similar procedures. In none of those cases, however, was monitoring 
136 DO] Oversight Hearings, supra note 8 (written testimony of Gerald H. Goldstein, Na-
tional Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers) (Dec. 4, 2001), http:/ /judiciary.senate. 
gov I testimony.cfm?id= 128&wit_id=82. 
137 /d. (written testimony of Nadine Strossen, President, ACLU) (Dec. 4, 2001), http:/ 
/judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfrn?id=128&wit_id=83. 
138 429 U.S. 545, 557 (1977). 
139 Prevention of Acts of Violence and Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 55,062, 55,064 (Oct. 31, 
2001) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pts. 500 & 501). 
140 Note, supra note 92, at 1157. 
141 Prevention of Acts of Violence and Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. at 55,064. 
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done m a systematic manner nor was the court completely side-
stepped. In addition, the cases did not involve instances in which the 
attorney and client should }1ave had reason to fear being overheard. 
Thus, the freedom of their communications was not chilled. 
The rule summary cites National City Trading Cmp. v. United 
States142 as supporting its procedures. First, the case is not directly on 
point because it was decided entirely on Fourth Amendment 
grounds. 143 Second, the case involved the search of an office floor 
that included both the defendant's and tl1e lawyer's individual offices. 
However, the police had a warrant for their search that was issued by a 
magistrate. The Second Circuit upheld the warrant, finding that it 
was supported with probable cause and sufficient specificity. In addi-
tion, tl1e police did not conduct their search until the lawyer was pre-
sent.144 The role of a judge in tt~is search distin~t.Iishes the case from 
the BOP rule. 
The Justice Department also cites United States v. Noriega145 as an 
example of similar screening procedures used in wiretap surveillance. 
In Noriega the prison had a policy of recording all inmate phone con-
versations, except for discussions 1viL"IJ their lawyers. 146 A judge ap-
proved a subpoena duces tecum served upon the prison custodian of 
records for copies of a number of the defendant's conversations. 147 
Prison officials accidentally recorded conversations between the de-
fendant and his lawyer. 148 These conversations were obtained 
tl1rough tl1e subpoena and then mistakenly reduced to memorandum 
form and presented to the prosecution. 149 The court applied the 
analysis of United States v Steele150 in arriving at its conclusion that no 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel had been violated. 151 
Noriega can also be distinguished from the rule it is cited to sup-
port. First, the discovery of governmental intrusion occurred after the 
attorney-client conversation had taken place.152 Thus the freedom of 
attorney and client to communicate was not likely inhibited. Second, 
in Noriega a judge approved the subpoenas of the conversations. 153 
Thus, a judge was involved in determining tl1e prop1iety of obtaining 
certain conversations. It is unclear whetl1er the judge would have ap-
142 
143 
144 
1-46 
1-17 
148 
149 
150 
151 
152 
153 
635 F.2d 1020, 1026-27 (2d Cir. 1980). 
See id. 
See id. at 1024-27. 
764 F. Supp. 1480 (S.D. Fla. 1991). 
!d. at 1482-83. 
!d. at 1483. 
!d. at 1484. 
I d. 
727 F.2d 580 (6th Cir. 1984); see supra notes 112-15 and accompanying text. 
See Noriega, 764 F. Supp. at 1489. 
See id. at 1484. 
See id. at 1483. 
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proved the subpoenas had anyone been aware that the recordings 
contained attomey-client communications. Finally, there were no sys-
tematic procedures in place to record all attorney-client communica-
tions.154 Rather, the recording was done inadvertently. The district 
court noted that the screening procedures suggested that the intru-
sion was unintentional and served as a basis for avoiding a dismissal of 
the indictment.155 
C. The Necessity of Court Involvement 
The BOP rule should be revised. The Justice Department must 
heed the Weatheiford and DiDomenico Sixth Amendment concems 
about chilling attorney-client communications. In honoring the Wea-
theiford dissent's call for prophylactic measures to guard the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel, the most obvious measure that might 
cure the BOP rule would be a requirement that a judge approve the 
monitoring of certain attorney-client communications. 
Given the Justice Department's recent plans to focus FBI efforts 
on thwarting acts of terrorism, rather than on prosecuting cases, it is 
unclear whether a valid separation can exist now between prosecu-
tion, investigation, monitoring, and other ostensibly preventative law 
enforcement efforts.156 Moreover, court involvement should not be 
relegated to a post-monitoring stage, merely for the purpose of deter-
mining disclosure to investigators and prosecutors. 
Indeed, as cases have made clear, it is all too difficult to deter-
mine if, in fact, overzealous prosecutors have or have not already ob-
tained such information. It would seem logical in an area of great 
constitutional significance, and in particular one that protects defend-
ants from the government's powers, that a judge, and not the govern-
ment itself, should determine whether the circumstances warrant 
intrusion of the Sixth Amendment. Moreover, a judge, and not the 
government, should determine whether prejudice would occur, and 
thus whether a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights would be 
violated. 
Critics argue that obtaining such court approval would take too 
long, 157 but such criticism seems dubious. Warrants issue at all times 
of the night and have hardly slowed down the speed of law enforce-
154 See id. at 1482-83. 
155 See id. at 1489. 
156 See McGee, supra note 2. 
157 See, e.g., DO] Oversight Hearings, supra note 8 (written testimony of Victoria 
Toensing, former Deputy Assistant Attorney General) (Dec. 4, 2001), http:/ /judici-
ary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=l28&wit_id=84. In her testimony before the Senate judi-
ciary Committee, Toensing suggested that a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) 
court could be created "to review the finding of reasonable suspicion to believe the inmate 
may use communications to further acts of terrorism. No matter what judicial-type body is 
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ment and prosecutions. Indeed, in times of emergency, perhaps such 
monitoring should be permitted, contingent on obtaining court au-
thorization ·within a specified time limit. 
IV 
THE RoLE oF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILITY RuLES 
The BOP rule presents ethical dilemmas for defense lawyers as 
well. As Irwin Schwartz, President of the National Association of 
Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL) has pointed out, under the .lVIodel 
Code of Professional Responsibility158 a lawyer "may not talk to [his] client 
at all about something confidential if there's a third party listening. 
So if there's a possibility that a third party is listening and [the lawyer] 
ca:n't talk to [his] client, he's stripped of his 1igl1t to legal 
representation."159 
Although much of the problem with the BOP rule involves it~ 
notification of the monitoring to lawyer and client, there are secretive 
portions of the BOP rule that also implicate the Jvlodel Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility. The BOP rule appears to allow some surveillance, 
provided the BOP obtains prior court authorization. 160 The uncer-
tainty of the attorney-client privilege would also bar lawyers from com-
municating with their clients. 161 John Wesley Hall,Jr., chairman of the 
NACDL ethics committee, observed that the rule limits a lavvyer's 
options: 
You can't talk to a client if you can't guarantee privilege, so you 
have to file a motion with the court and get the government to put 
up or shut up .... But of course they don't have to tell you [when 
they have a court order allowing them to keep their surveillance 
secret] .162 
used, the standard should not be the more onerous probable cause of Title III wiretap." 
id. 
158 See MoDEL CoDE OF PRoF'L REsroNSIBILI"IY EC 4-1, 4-2, 4-4 (1981 ); MoDEL RuLES OF 
PRoF'L CoNDUCT R. 1.6 (2000). 
159 Weehend All Things Considered (NPR radio broadcast, Dec. 8, 2001); see also Steven 
Kimelman, Protecting Privilege, NAT'L LJ., Dec. 3, 2001, at A21 ("I seriously doubt whether 
an attorney could even ethically undertake to represent someone with these restrictions in 
place."). 
It is also unlikely any defendant will talk upon notification, so the mles will be self-
defeating in some respects. See Shuster, supra note 110. Paul L. Hoffman, a California civil 
rights lawyer was quoted as observing, "I just can't imagine that lawyers and clients could 
have the same kinds of conversations if they know that someone's going to listen to it .... 
You're never going to get anyone ... who's going to talk about future criminal activity. It's 
completely preposterous." !d. 
160 See Prevention of Acts of Violence and Terrmism, 66 Fed. Reg. 55,062, 55,066 (Oct. 
31, 2001) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pts. 500 & 501). 
161 See MoDEL CoDE OF PRoF'L REsroNSIBILITY EC 4-1, '!-2, 4-4, 4-5 (1981); David E. 
Rove II a, Ashcroft Rule Puts Defenders in a Bind, NAT'L LJ., Dec. 3, 2001, at A1. 
162 Rovella, supra note 161. 
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Professor Jonathan Turley has argued that it would be unethical for a 
defense lawyer not to challenge government monitoring. But if the 
challenge did not succeed, the lawyer could ethically continue his 
represen tation. 163 
In many respects, the BOP rule is unnecessary when the lawyer is 
an ethical practitioner.164 Under Model Rule 1.2(d) "[a] lawyer shall 
not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the 
lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent." 165 Model Rule 1.6(b) (1) fur-
ther states that "[a] lawyer may reveal such information to the extent 
the lawyer reasonably believes necessary ... to prevent the client from 
committing a criminal act that the lawyer believes is likely to result in 
imminent death or substantial bodily harm."166 
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct do not, however, impose a 
mandatory obligation on lawyers to disclose information-the rules 
are simply discretionary. More importantly, the rules only address in-
stances in which the lawyer learns of prospective client crimes. The 
rules do not include situations in which the lawyer obtains informa-
tion from his client relating to life threatening acts of third persons. 167 
Professor Roger Cramton and commentator Lori Knowles have sug-
gested revising Model Rule 1.6 to permit disclosure "to the extent the 
lawyer reasonably believes necessary ... to prevent reasonably certain 
death or substantial bodily harm."168 This revision would no doubt 
alleviate some of the Justice Department's concerns with respect to 
some lawyers' ethical reasons for nondisclosure. 
No doubt the Justice Department would also prefer that profes-
sional responsibility rules make disclosure mandatory in the above in-
stances. Presently only eleven states' ethics codes require lawyers to 
disclose a client's intent to commit a crime that would likely result in 
death or substantial injury.l69 However, such a requirement ignores 
the "variety and uniqueness of the circumstances that must be consid-
163 See id. The ethical obligation to challenge is presumably based upon Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct Rule 1.3 cmt. 1 (2000). The comment explains: 
!d. 
A lawyer should pursue a matter on behalf of a client despite opposition ... 
and may take whatever lawful and ethical measures are required to vindi-
cate a client's cause or endeavor. A lawyer should act with commitment 
and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon 
the client's behalf. 
164 Rules of professional responsibility may not, of course, address the unwitting lawyer 
who is engaged as merely an unaware mouthpiece. Also, lawyers who act as participants in 
acts of terrorism are beyond the scope of the ethics rules. 
165 MoDEL RuLES OF PRoF'L CoNDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2000). 
166 Jd. R. 1.6(b) (1). 
167 See Cramton & Knowles, supra note 37, at 106-17. 
168 Id. at 124. 
169 See THoMAs D. MoRGAN & RoNALD D. RoTUNDA, 2001 SELECTED STANDARDS ON PRO· 
FESSIONAL REsPONSIBILITY 136-46 (2001). 
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ered" when lmvyers learn certain information from their clients. 170 A 
blanket rule would ignore the facts of each particular case. Despite 
some lawyers' notable deviations from ethical and moral behavior, 171 
the profession and society will be better served if exceptions to confi-
dentiality are phrased in discretionary language. 
CoNCLUSION 
The attorney-client privilege and the Sixth Amendment embody 
principles of both privacy and fairness. In an adversarial system, tl1ese 
principles are all the more important-particularly when a defendant 
faces the state, an already imposing and powerful entity but one that is 
even more fearsome at times of war. Prosecutors should not be given 
carte blanche to do away with defendants' rights. Even if the govern-
ment erects a wall to keep information from the prosecution, fairness 
and privacy concerns are still implicated. Defendants will not disclose 
sufficient information to their lawyers, feeling inhibited by the moni-
toring, and thu.s v~rill not be or1 adequate footing witl1 the gover11me11t. 
Fairness and privacy interests are paramount, and should not be in-
vaded by Lhe government 'Arithout court approval. 
170 See Cramton Sc Knowles, supra note 37, at 1] 9. 
171 See, e.g., Spauldingv. Zimmerman, 116 N.W.2d 704,710 (Minn. 1962) (setting aside 
a settlement agreement because the defense lawyer did not disclose life threatening medi-
cal examination results to the plaintiff before entering into the agreement); see al.so HA.z-
ARD ET AL., sujJTa note 72, at 310-33 (discussing the lawyer's duty to warn, duty of 
confidentiality, and related concerns). 
